Despite 30+ years of intensive research, the distributed computing community still does not have a practical answer to non-crash faults of the machines that comprise a distributed system. In particular, Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT), that promises to handle such faults, has not lived to expectations due to its resource and operation overhead with respect to its crash fault-tolerant (CFT) counterparts. This overhead comes from the worst-case assumption about Byzantine faults, in the sense that some coordinated adversarial activity controls the faulty machines and the entire network at will. To practitioners, however, such strong attacks appear irrelevant.
Introduction
Tolerating any kind of service disruption, whether caused by a simple hardware fault or by a largescale disaster, is key for the survival of modern distributed systems at cloud-scale and has direct implications on the business behind them [21] . Production systems today (e.g., [11] , [5] ) increase the number of nines of reliability 1 by employing sophisticated distributed protocols that tolerate crash machine faults as well as network faults such as network partitions, or asynchrony, which reflects the inability of correct machines to communicate among each other in a timely manner. At the heart of these systems typically lies a crash fault-tolerant (CFT) consensus-based state machine replication (SMR) primitive [31, 7] . It is often used to maintain a critical portion of system metadata in a consistent and highly available way, so that the resilience of the rest of the system can be based on it.
These distributed systems cannot deal with non-crash faults, which include soft errors in the hardware, stale or corrupted data from storage systems, memory errors caused by physical effects, sleeping bugs in software, hardware faults due to ever smaller and faster circuits, and last but not least, human mistakes that corrupt the state of a system or cause data loss. Each of those faults has a public record of taking down production systems and corrupting their service, including those of major cloud and social network providers [12, 3] . This is hardly surprising, since the probability that a "very rare" machine fault (say, one that happens with probability p = 10 −5 ) affects some machine becomes significant when one considers the ever larger clusters of today, comprising n > 100, 000 machines (in our example, at least 1 − (1 − p) n ≥ 0.63).
Despite more than 30 years of intensive research in distributed computing since the seminal work of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [26] , no practical answer to tolerating non-crash faults has emerged yet. In particular, Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT) that promises to resolve this problem [6] has not lived up to this expectation, due to its large cost compared to CFT solutions. For example, in the context of asynchronous (that is, eventually synchronous [16] ) BFT SMR, this overhead implies using at least 3t + 1 replicas to tolerate t non-crash faults (instead of 2t + 1 in the case of CFT) .
The overhead of BFT is due to the extraordinary power given to the adversary, which may control both the faulty machines and the entire network in a coordinated way. In line with observations by practitioners [22] , we claim that this adversary model is actually too strong for the phenomena observed in deployed systems: The non-crash faults experienced today occur independently of network faults (and often also independently of each other), just like a network switch failing due to a soft error has no correlation with a server that was misconfigured by an operator. The proverbial all-powerful attacker as a common source behind those faults is a popular and powerful simplification used for the design phase, but it has not seen equivalent proliferation in practice. Surprisingly, though, the reliability models that decouple network faults (i.e., asynchrony) from machine faults (yet allow for both classes of faults) have not been adequately studied.
In this paper, we introduce XFT (short for cross fault tolerance), a novel approach to building reliable distributed systems that decouples the fault space across machine and network faults dimensions, treating machine and network faults independently. This is in sharp contrast to existing CFT and BFT models that discern system faults only along the machine fault dimension. Similarly, XFT offers much more flexibility than traditional synchronous and asynchronous models that (too strictly) fix the network fault model of interest regardless of the machine faults. In a nutshell, our XFT approach allows to build systems tolerate a certain class of faults (e.g., crash faults) regardless of network faults (asynchrony), and another class of faults (e.g., non-crash faults) only when there are no network faults (i.e., when the system is synchronous).
As the showcase for XFT, we present Paxos++, the first state machine replication protocol in the XFT model. Paxos++ tolerates faults beyond crashes in an efficient and practical way, achieving much greater coverage of realistic failure scenarios than the state-of-the-art CFT SMR protocols, such as Paxos [24] . Going beyond the guarantees also provided by Paxos and other CFT protocols, Paxos++ tolerates up to t non-crash faults whenever these do not coincide with network faults. This comes without resource and performance overhead, as Paxos++ uses 2t+1 replicas, while maintaining the same performance (common-case communication complexity) as Paxos. Surprisingly, Paxos++ sometimes (depending on the system environment) offers even strictly stronger reliability guarantees than state-of-the-art BFT replication protocols.
Aligned with the industry practice, we express the reliability guarantees and coverage of fault scenarios through nines of reliability. More specifically, we distinguish nines of availability (for liveness) and nines of consistency (for safety) [1] and use these measures to compare different fault models. By introducing a concrete way for substantiating fault models analytically, we also aim at enhancing the understanding of assumptions and models, which are often left unquestioned by protocol developers. Such a shift to the classical vocabulary of reliability engineering is in contrast to expressing reliability solely in terms of failure thresholds, which is a "standard" approach in the distributed computing community yet difficult to enforce and reason about in practice. We believe that this shift will also connect distributed systems better to real-world problems.
In the rest of the paper, we define the system model (Sec. 2) , introduce the XFT reliability model (Sec. 3) , and present Paxos++ (Sec. 4) . We overview related work and conclude in Sec. 5. Pseudocode and a correctness proof for Paxos++ are postponed to appendices.
Decoupling machine from network faults
In a nutshell, XFT ("cross fault tolerance") decouples machine faults from network faults. XFT considers the faults in a distributed system as arising from different causes and decouples faults across the dimensions of the machines and the network from each other. This stands in sharp contrast to CFT and BFT, which model only machine faults explicitly. In the classical approach, the CFT and BFT models are then typically combined with an orthogonal network fault model, either with the synchronous model (where network faults in our sense are ruled out) or the asynchronous model (that includes network faults). Hence, previous work can be classified into four categories: synchronous CFT [14, 31] , asynchronous CFT [31, 24, 28] , synchronous BFT [26, 15, 4] , and asynchronous BFT [6, 2] .
XFT, in contrast, redefines the boundaries between these dimensions: XFT allows designing reliable protocols that tolerate one class of machine faults (e.g., crash faults) regardless of the network faults (asynchrony) and that, at the same time, tolerate another type of machine faults (e.g., noncrash faults) only when there are no network faults (no asynchrony). The Paxos++ state machine replication (SMR) protocol, that we introduce later, exemplifies our XFT approach.
The XFT approach greatly enlarges the flexibility in the choice of practically relevant fault scenarios. The intuition behind XFT starts from the observation that "extremely bad" system conditions, such as simultaneous non-crash machine faults and network faults, are very rare and might not be worth paying the premium. With XFT, for example, we can design a practical SMR protocol (Paxos++) that uses only n = 2t + 1 replicas, yet tolerates t replicas that exhibit non-crash faults.
Before illustrating the difference between CFT, BFT, and XFT in the context of SMR, we emphasize that in this paper, we consider XFT protocols that distinguish only crash and non-crash machine faults (along the machine fault dimension), and complete absence or presence of asynchrony (along the network fault dimension). However, XFT is far more general and can be easily extended to include multiple and finer grained fault classes along the machine fault dimension (e.g., distinguishing data loss from data corruption). Similarly, along the network fault dimension, one may distinguish the number of links that are affected by network faults. Implications on state machine replication (SMR). We illustrate the guarantees of the consensus and SMR protocols in the CFT, BFT, and XFT models in Fig. 1-2 . A state-of-the-art asynchronous CFT protocol [25, 18, 29] guarantees consistency (safety) despite any number of crash machine faults and despite network faults. It also guarantees availability (liveness) whenever (a) a majority of replicas is correct (t = In the XFT model, however, a protocol may guarantee at least as much as a CFT protocol, but in addition also consistency and availability with up to t = n−1 2 non-crash faulty replicas, provided there are no simultaneous network faults (Fig. 2) .
We observe that an XFT protocol such as Paxos++ provides strictly stronger reliability (consistency and availability) than a CFT protocol. Similarly, an XFT protocol offers strictly more availability than a BFT protocol due to the higher threshold of tolerated replica faults. The comparison between the consistency guarantees of XFT and BFT remains open, as BFT has wider coverage (guarantees under network faults despite non-crash machine faults) but tolerates fewer non-crash faulty replicas. Indeed, as shown in the following, XFT may provide stronger consistency guarantees than BFT and vice versa. In summary, XFT eliminates the coverage for the upper right quadrant in Fig. 2 and thereby enables solutions that combine some of the best features of the CFT and BFT models.
Quantifying the benefits of XFT
To illustrate the power of the XFT model, we compare the guarantees of an XFT protocol, exemplified by Paxos++, to those of current CFT and BFT protocols. We focus here on consistency, as XFT protocols guarantee better availability than both CFT and BFT in any case (see Fig. 1 and 2 ).
We start with the number of nines of consistency for a CFT protocol, denoted by 9ofC(CF T ) = 9of(P [CFT is consistent]). Recalling that 9ofC(CF T ) = p n benign , a straightforward calculation yields:
which gives 9ofC(CF T ) ≈ 9 benign − log 10 (n) for values of p benign close to 1, when p i benign decreases slowly. As a rule of thumb, for small values of n, i.e., n < 10, we have 9ofC(CF T ) ≈ 9 benign − 1.
In other words, in typical configurations, where few faults are tolerated [11] , a CFT system as a whole loses one nine of consistency from the likelihood that an individual replica be benign.
XFT vs. CFT. We now quantify the advantage of an XFT SMR protocol over one in the CFT model. From Fig. 1 and 2 we have:
To illustrate this difference, we observed the following conjectured relation for 3 = n = 2t + 1, which we verified for all values of 9 benign and 9 synchrony between 1 and 20: 4 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) − 9ofC(CF T t=1 ) = min(9 benign , 9 synchrony ). Example 1. When t = 1, p benign = 0.9999 and p synchrony = 0.999, 9ofC(CF T t=1 ) = 9 benign − 1 = 3, whereas 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) − 9ofC(CF T t=1 ) = 9 synchrony = 3, i.e., 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) = 6. In this example, XFT adds 3 nines of consistency on top of CFT and achieves 6 nines of consistency in total.
XFT vs. BFT. We first examine the conditions under which XFT has stronger consistency guarantees than BFT. Fixing the value t of tolerated faults we have, we observe that P [XFT is consistent] > P [BFT is consistent] is equivalent to:
For t = 1, the above inequality simplifies to (p synchrony − p benign ) (1 − p benign ) > 0. Therefore, for t = 1, an XFT SMR protocol has stronger consistency guarantees than a BFT one whenever the network is "better behaved" than machines, i.e., when p synchrony > p benign . In nines of consistency, again for t = 1, we conjecture (and have verified for 1 ≤ 9 benign , 9 synchrony ≤ 20) that:
Notice that in cases where XFT guarantees better consistency than BFT (p synchrony > p benign ), it is only "slightly" better and does not materialize in additional nines. In any case, BFT remains more expensive than XFT as t = 1 implies 4 replicas for BFT and only 3 for XFT.
Example 1 (cont.). Building upon our example when t = 1, p benign = 0.9999 and p synchrony = 0.999, we have 9ofC(BF T t=1 ) − 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) = 9 benign − 9 synchrony = 1. As 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) = 6, we have 9ofC(BF T t=1 ) = 7, i.e., BFT in this example brings one nine of consistency on top of XFT (albeit only the 7th).
Example 2. In a slightly different example, where p benign = p synchrony = 0.9999, we have 9ofC(CF T t=1 ) = 3, and 9ofC(XF T t=1 ) = 9ofC(BF T t=1 ) = 7. In this example, XFT already brings all the consistency benefits of BFT, and has 4 nines of consistency more than CFT.
The Paxos++ protocol
Paxos++ is a new state machine replication (SMR) protocol, the first in the XFT model, ensuring consistency and availability as depicted in Fig. 2 . Paxos++ explicitly renounces to provide guarantees under the system condition in which non-crash faults co-exist with network faults among correct replicas; we refer to this severe system condition as to anarchy.
We first briefly overview Paxos++. In a nutshell, Paxos++ consists of three main components :
• a common-case protocol, which replicates and totally orders requests across replicas; this has, roughly speaking, the message pattern and complexity of communication among replicas of stateof-the-art CFT protocols (e.g., Phase 2 of Paxos), hardened by the use of digital signatures;
• a novel view change protocol, in which the information is transferred from one view (system configuration) to another in a decentralized, leaderless fashion; and,
• a fault detection (FD) mechanism, which can help detect, outside anarchy, non-crash faults that would leave the system in an inconsistent state in anarchy. The FD mechanism serves to minimize the impact of long-lived non-crash faults in the system and help detect them before they coincide with network faults and push the system to anarchy.
Paxos++ is orchestrated in a sequence of views [6] . The central idea in Paxos++ is that, in a common-case operation in a given view, Paxos++ synchronously replicates the requests from the clients to only t+1 replicas, which are the members of a synchronous group (out of n = 2t+1 replicas in total). Each view number i uniquely determines the synchronous group, sg i , using a mapping known to all replicas. Every synchronous group consists of one primary and t followers, which are jointly called active replicas. Remaining t replicas in a given view are called passive replicas; optionally, passive replicas learn the order from the active replicas using the lazy replication approach [23] . A view is not changed unless there is a machine or network fault within its synchronous group.
In the common case (Section 4.1), the clients send digitally signed requests to the primary which are then replicated to the t + 1 active replicas. These t + 1 replicas digitally sign and locally log the proofs for all replicated requests to their commit logs. Commit logs then serve as the basis for maintaining consistency in view changes.
In Paxos++ view change (Section 4.2), all t + 1 active replicas from the new synchronous group sg i+1 try to transfer the state from preceding views to view i + 1. This decentralized approach to view change is in sharp contrast to classical reconfiguration/view-change in CFT and BFT protocols (e.g., [24, 6] ), in which only a single process (the primary) leads the view change and transfers the state from previous views. This difference is crucial to maintaining consistency (i.e., linearizability) across Paxos++ views in the presence of non-crash faults (but in the absence of full anarchy), despite replicating only across t + 1 replicas in the common case. Paxos++ novel and decentralized viewchange scheme guarantees that, even in presence of non-crash faults, so long as there are no network faults among correct replicas, at least one correct replica from the new view i + 1 will be able to transfer the correct state from previous views, as it will be able to contact correct replicas from previous views (at least one for each preceding view).
Finally, the main idea behind the FD scheme of Paxos++ (Section 4.3) is the following. In view change, a non-crash faulty replica (of the old synchronous group) might omit to transfer its latest state to a correct replica in the new synchronous group which may violate consistency in anarchy. However, such a fault can be detected and overcome by sending the commit log from the correct replicas (of the old synchronous group), provided that correct replicas can communicate (i.e., that there are no network faults). In a sense, with Paxos++ FD, a critical non-crash machine fault must occur for the first time together with a network fault to violate consistency. Hence, FD minimizes the Paxos++ vulnerability window and helps prevent machine faults from persisting long enough to coincide with network faults.
In the following, we explain the core of Paxos++ for the common-case (Sec. Figure 3 gives Paxos++ common-case message patterns in the special case when t = 1 and in the general case when t ≥ 2. Paxos++ is specifically optimized for the case where t = 1, as in this case, there are only two active replicas in each view. The special case t = 1 is also very relevant in practice (see e.g., Google Spanner [11] ). In the following, we denote the digest of a message m by D(m), whereas m σp denotes a message that contains both D(m) signed by the private key of machine p and m. 
Common case
Figure 3: Paxos++ common-case message patterns for t = 1 and t ≥ 2 (here t = 2). Synchronous group illustrated are (s 0 ,s 1 ) (when t = 1) and (s 0 ,s 1 ,s 2 ) (when t = 2), respectively.
Tolerating a single fault. For t = 1 (see Fig. 3(a) ), the Paxos++ common case involves only 2 messages between 2 active replicas. Upon receiving a signed request req = replicate, op, ts c , c σc from client c (where op is the client's operation and ts c is the clients' timestamp), the primary (say s 0 ) increments the sequence number sn, signs sn along the digest of req and view number i in message General case. In case t ≥ 2, the common-case message pattern of Paxos++ (see Fig. 3(b) ) contains an explicit prepare phase. More specifically, the primary (s 0 ) assigns a sequence number sn to a client's signed replicate request req and forwards it to all other active replicas (i.e, the t followers) within req, prep = prepare, D(req), sn, i σs 0 . Each follower verifies the primary's and client's signatures, checks if its local sequence number equals sn − 1, and logs req, prep into its prepare log P repareLog * [sn]. Then, a follower updates its local sequence number, signs the digest of the request, the view number and the sequence number, and forwards it to all active replicas within a commit message. Upon receiving t signed commit messages -one from each follower -(with a matching entry in the prepare log), an active replica logs prep and the t signed commit messages into its commit log CommitLog * [sn]. Finally, each active replica executes the request and sends the reply to the client (followers may only send the digest of the reply). The client commits the request when it receives matching reply messages from all t + 1 active replicas.
In both cases (t = 1 or t ≥ 2), a client that timeouts without committing the requests, broadcasts the request to all replicas. Active replicas then forward such request to the primary and trigger a retransmission timer within which a correct active replica expects the client's request to be committed.
View change
Intuition. The ordered requests in commit logs of correct replicas are the key to enforcing consistency (total order) in Paxos++. To illustrate Paxos++ view change, consider synchronous groups sg i and sg i+1 of views i and i + 1, respectively, each containing t + 1 replicas. Proofs of requests committed in sg i might be logged by as few as a single correct replica in sg i . Nevertheless, Paxos++ view change must ensure that (outside anarchy) these proofs are transferred to the new view i + 1. To this end, we had to depart from traditional view change techniques [6, 20, 10] where the entire view change is led by a single replica, usually the primary of the new view. Namely, in Paxos++ view-change, every active replica in sg i+1 retrieves information about requests committed in preceding views. Intuitively, at least one correct replica from sg i+1 will contact (at least one) correct replica from sg i and transfer, in absence of network faults, the latest correct commit log to the new view i + 1.
In the following, we first describe how we choose active replicas for each view. Then, we explain how view changes are initiated. Finally, we explain how view changes are performed.
Choosing active replicas. To choose active replicas for view i, we enumerate all sets containing t + 1 replicas (i.e., 2t+1 t+1 sets) which then alternate as synchronous groups across views in a round robin fashion. Additionally, each synchronous group uniquely determines the primary. We assume that the mapping from view numbers to synchronous groups is known to all replicas (see e.g., Table 1 ).
View change initiation. If a synchronous group in view i (denoted by sg i ) does not make progress, Paxos++ performs a view change. Only an active replica of sg i may initiate a view change.
An active replica s j ∈ sg i initiates a view change if: (i) s j receives a message from another active replica that does not conform to the protocol (e.g., an invalid signature), (ii) the retransmission timer at s j expires, (iii) s j does not complete a view change to view i in a timely manner, or (iv) s j receives a valid suspect message for view i from another active replica. Upon view change initiation, s j stops participating in the current view and sends suspect, i, s j σs j to all other replicas.
Performing view-change. (see the message pattern in Fig. 4 ) Upon receiving suspect message from some active replica in view i, replica s j stops processing messages of view i and sends m = view-change, i+1, s j , CommitLog s j σs j to t+1 replicas in sg i+1 . A view-change message contains the commit log CommitLog s j stored by s j . Commit logs might be empty (e.g., if s j was passive). 5 Note that Paxos++ requires all active replicas in new view to attempt to collect the most recent state and its proof (i.e., view-change messages), rather than the new primary itself. Otherwise, a faulty new primary could purposely omit the view-change message which contains the most recent state, even outside anarchy. Active replica s j ∈ sg i+1 waits for at least n − t view-change messages from all, but also waits for at least 2∆ time trying to establish the connection to each replica.
Upon completion of the above protocol, s j ∈ sg i+1 inserts all view-change messages it has received in a set V CSet i+1 . Then s j sends vc-final, i + 1, V CSet i+1 σs j to every active replica in view i + 1. This step is to exchange view-change messages that each active replica has received.
Finally, before requests may be processed in view i+1, all active replicas in sg i+1 receive vc-final messages from all other active replicas in sg i+1 . Then, for any given sequence number sn, active replicas select the commit log with the highest view number from all view-change messages, to confirm the committed request at sn (might be null ). Afterwards, the primary ps i+1 ∈ sg i+1 prepares all committed requests by sending new-view, i+1, P repareLog σps i+1 to t+1 active replicas in sg i+1 , where P repareLog contains the prepare log generated in view i + 1 for each committed request. Upon receiving new-view message, every active replica prepares and replies to messages in P repareLog as in the common case (see Section 4.1), except re-executing requests. Active replicas finally make sure that all requests in P repareLog are committed in view i + 1. When this condition is satisfied locally, active replicas in view i + 1 can start processing new requests.
Fault detection
Unlike BFT, Paxos++ does not guarantee consistency in anarchy. Hence, a non-crash fault could violate Paxos++ consistency in the long run, if it persists long enough to eventually coincide with a network fault.
To cope with long lived faults, we propose a Fault Detection (FD) mechanism. Roughly speaking, FD guarantees the following property: if a process p fails arbitrarily outside anarchy, in a way that would cause inconsistency in anarchy, then Paxos++ FD detects p as faulty (outside anarchy). In other words, any potentially fatal fault that occurs when there are no network faults, would be detected by Paxos++ FD. Here, we sketch how FD works in case t = 1, focusing on detecting a specific non-crash fault that may render Paxos++ inconsistent in anarchy -a data loss fault by which an arbitrary faulty replica loses some of its commit log prior to view change. 6 Our FD mechanism entails modifying Paxos++ view change as follows: in addition to exchanging their commit logs, replicas also exchange their prepare logs. Notice that in case t = 1 only the primary maintains a prepare log (see Section 4.1). In the new view, the primary will prepare and the follower will commit transferred requests both in commit logs and in prepare logs.
With the above modification, to violate consistency, a faulty primary (of preceding view i) would need not only to exhibit a data loss fault in its commit log, but also in its prepare log. However, such a data loss fault in the primary's prepare log would be detected, outside anarchy, because (i) the (correct) follower of view i would reply in the view change and (ii) an entry in the primary's prepare log causally precedes the respective entry in the follower's commit log. By simply verifying the signatures in the follower's commit log the fault of a primary is detected. Conversely, a data loss fault in the commit log of the follower of view i is (in case t = 1) simply detected outside anarchy by verifying the signatures in the commit log of the primary of view i.
Paxos++ optimizations
Although, Paxos++ as described above is sufficient to guarantee correctness, several standard performance optimizations can be optionally applied to Paxos++. These include checkpointing and lazy replication [23] to passive replicas (to help shorten the state transfer during view change) as well as batching (to improve the throughput).
Checkpointing. Similarly to many other replication protocols, Paxos++ can include a checkpointing mechanism that allows for garbage collection. To this end, every CHK requests (where CHK is a configurable parameter) Paxos++ checkpoints the state within the synchronous group. Note that active replicas generate a checkpoint proof only upon the replicas confirm that every request implied by this checkpoint has been committed by every active replica.
More specifically, (refer to message pattern in Figure 5 ) upon an active replica s j ∈ sg i commits and executes a CHK request, s j sends prechk, CHK, i, D(st CHK ), s j σs j and sends m to every active replica. Upon receiving t + 1 matching chkpt messages, each active replica s j checkpoints the state and discards previous prepare log and commit log. Figure 6 : Paxos++ common-case message patterns with lazy replication for t = 1 and t ≥ 2 (here t = 2). Synchronous group illustrated are (s 0 ,s 1 ) (when t = 1) and (s 0 ,s 1 ,s 2 ) (when t = 2), respectively.
Besides, Paxos++ propagates checkpoint proofs to all passive replicas by lazychk, chkP roof to help speed up the view-change, where chkP roof contains t + 1 chkpt messages.
Lazy replication. To speed up the state transfer in view change, the followers in synchronous group lazily propagate the commit log to every passive replica. With lazy replication, the new active replica, which might be the passive replica in preceding view, could only retrieve the missing state from others.
More specifically (see message pattern in Figure 6 ), in case t = 1, upon committing request req, the follower sends commit log of req to the passive replica. In case t ≥ 2, each of t followers sends the commit log to a specific passive replica. Each passive replica commits and executes requests based on orders defined by commit log. 7 Batching. In order to improve the throughput of cryptographic operations, the primary batches several requests when preparing. The primary waits as soon as B requests has received, then signs the batched request and sends it to every follower. In case there are not enough requests received within a time limit, the primary batches all requests it has received. Figure 7 gives an example of Paxos++ execution when t = 1. The role of each replica in each view is shown in Table 1 .
Paxos++ example
In Figure 7 (a), view change phase proceeds without fault detection. Upon the primary s 0 receives requests r0, r1, and r2 from clients, s 0 prepares these requests locally and sends commit messages to the follower s 1 . Then, s 1 commits r0, r1, and r2 locally and sends commit messages to s 0 . Because of network fault of s 1 , s 0 only receives commit message of r0 in a timely manner, thus the view change phase to i + 1 is activated by s 0 . During view change to i + 1, s 0 sends the view-change message with commit log of r 0 to all active replicas in view i + 1 (i.e., s 0 and s 2 ). In view i + 1, r3 is further committed by s 0 and s 2 . After that, s 0 is under non-crash fault and the view is changed to i + 2. During view change to i + 2, s 1 and s 2 provide all their commit logs to new active replicas (i.e., s 1 and s 2 ), whereas non-crash faulty replica s 0 only reports the commit log of r0. Outside anarchy, requests r0 and r3 are committed in new view i + 2 by receiving the view-change message from s 2 . Request r 3 is also committed by receiving the view-change message from s 1 . In view i + 2, r1 is finally committed. The final state at each (correct) replica is r0, r3, r2, r1 . For an application like key-value store, if r0 = W (A, 0),r1 = W (A, 1)..., then the final state of object A is 1. In example of Figure 7 (b), Paxos++ fault detection is enabled. In view i, the execution is the same as in Figure 7 (a). During view change to i + 1, commit log of r0 and prepare logs of r1 and r2 are sent by s 0 , which are committed by s 0 and s 2 in view i + 1, as well as the new request r3. The same as before, s 0 is non-crash faulty and the view is changed to i + 2. During view change to i + 2, commit logs of r0, r1, r2 and r3 are sent by s 2 . At the same time, because of missing prepare log of r3, the fault of s 0 is detected with the help of the view-change message from s 2 . The final state at each (correct) replica is r0, r1, r2, r3 , the object A is 3.
Correctness arguments
Consistency (Total Order). Paxos++ enforces the following invariant, which is key to total order. Lemma 1. Outside anarchy, if a benign client c commits a request req with sequence number sn in view i, and a benign replica s k commits the request req with sn in view i > i, then req = req .
A benign client c commits request req with sequence number sn in view i, only after c receives matching replies from t + 1 active replicas in sg i . This implies that every benign replica in vs i stores request req into its commit log under sequence number sn. As |vs i | = t + 1, this includes at least one correct replica in vs i , say s j .
We focus here on the special case where: i = i + 1. This serves as the base step for the proof of Lemma 1 by induction across views that we postpone to Appendix B.1.
Assume without loss of generality that s k ∈ sg i+1 (the proof for passive replicas in view i + 1 follows). Then, in the view change to view i + 1, s k polls all replica for commit log transfer and waits for response from t + 1 replicas as well as the timer set to 2∆ to expire. Recall that, outside anarchy, (a) there are no network faults, or (b) all replicas are benign. In case (a), s j replies to s k within 2∆ and s k transfers the state from s j and hence req = req . In case (b), s k gets the reply from at least one out of t+1 benign replicas in sg i , say s m ; as s m committed request req under sn; req = req follows.
Availability. Availability in Paxos++ is guaranteed in case there are no network faults and the synchronous group contains only correct replicas. With eventual synchrony (see Section 2) we can assume that, eventually, there will be no network faults. Additionally, with all combinations of t + 1 replicas (out of 2t + 1) rotating in the role of active replicas, Paxos++ guarantees that, eventually, view change in Paxos++ will complete with t+1 correct active replicas. (see Appendix B.2 for details)
Strong completeness and accuracy of FD. In the following, we state the central lemmas pertaining to FD -the proofs can be found in Appendix B.3. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced XFT (cross fault tolerance), a novel approach to designing reliable systems that flexibly decouples machine from network faults. We demonstrated the power of the XFT model through Paxos++, the first state machine replication (SMR) protocol in the XFT model that tolerates faults beyond simple crashes, featuring many more nines of reliability than state of the art crashtolerant protocols with roughly the same communication complexity, performance and resource cost. Namely, Paxos++ uses 2t + 1 replicas to go beyond the guarantees of crash-tolerant protocols by tolerating t non-crash faulty machines, whenever non-crash faults do not coincide with network faults (asynchrony). We further quantified the benefits of XFT in terms of nines of reliability, showing also that, depending on system environment, XFT protocols such as Paxos++ can sometimes offer strictly stronger reliability than comparable BFT protocols.
Our XFT approach is fundamentally different from other approaches to reducing the resource cost of BFT, notably the approach based on trusted hardware (e.g., [13, 27, 19, 33] ). In contrast, Paxos++ is entirely realized in software, showing that benefits of trusted hardware are, in a sense, restricted to tolerating simultaneous non-crash machine and network faults.
We presented our XFT approach focusing on the interplay between different classes of machine faults with absence or presence of network faults. In this paper, we did not explore the impact on varying the number of tolerated faults per fault class. In short, this approach, known as the hybrid fault model and introduced in [32] distinguishes the threshold of non-crash faults (say b) despite which safety should be ensured, from the threshold t of faults (of any class) despite which the liveness should be ensured (where often b ≤ t). The hybrid fault model and its refinements [9, 30] appear orthogonal to our XFT approach; in future work it would be interesting to explore the interactions between the hybrid fault model and its refinements with our XFT approach. This paper opens more avenues for future work. We have considered only one instantiation of an XFT model; one could refine the type of machine and network faults considered, distinguishing between further classes and numbers of machine faults, as well as model network faults at finer granularity, e.g., considering the number of links affected by asynchrony. Furthermore, many protocols and lower bounds pertaining to distributed computing problems beyond SMR (e.g., distributed storage [8] ) deserve a novel look through the XFT prism. It would be also interesting to study XFT variants that account for possible correlations between worst-case machine and network faults.
Appendix A Paxos++ pseudocode
Common case : c, op, ts c -id of the client, operation, client timestamp req c -ongoing request at client c n -total number of replicas Π -set of n replicas i -current view number s j -replica id sg i -set of t + 1 replicas in synchronous group in view i ps i -the primary in view i (
rep -reply of client request sn sj -sequence number prepared at replica s j ex sj -sequence number executed at replica s j D(m) -digest of a message m P repareLog sj -array of prepared proof at replica s j CommitLog sj -array of commit proofs at replica s j View change : SusSet sj -set of suspect messages cached for view-change at replica s j timer net i -network establishment timer for view i ∆ -maximum message delay between two correct replicas, beyond which a network fault is declared timer In order to simplify the description (and the pseudocode), we assume that signature/MAC attached to each message always correctly verifies. Figure 8 gives the definition of message fields and local variables for all components of Paxos++. Readers can refer to Section 4 for protocol description.
To simplify the exposition, this appendix is organized incrementally as follows. Section A.1 gives the pseudocode of Paxos++ common case. Section A.2 gives the pseudocode of the view change mechanism. Sections A.3 gives pseudocode of modifications to the view change protocol to enable Fault Detection. Finally, Section A.4 gives pseudocode of clients' request retransmission mechanism that deals with faulty primary.
A.1 Common case
In common case, we assume that all replicas are in the same view. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 describe the common case protocol when t = 1 and t ≥ 2, respectively. Figure 3 gives the message pattern. inc(sn psi )
7: inc(sn f si )
13:
rep ← execute req 14: inc(ex f si )
15: stop timer c
A.2 View-change
The message pattern of view-change w/o fault detection is given in Figure 4 . Algorithm 3 shows the corresponding pseudocode. 
inc(ex sj )
20:
rep ← execute CommitLog sj [ex sj ].req 21: send reply, sn, i, req.ts c , rep µs j ,c to client c, where c = CommitLog sj [ex sj ].req.c) 22 : upon reception of t + 1 reply messages reply, sn, i, ts, rep µs j ,c at client c do
23:
if t + 1 reply messages are with the same sn, i, ts and rep and ts = req.ts c then 24: deliver rep
25:
stop timer c
A.3 Fault detection
Algorithm 4 gives the modifications based on Algorithm 3 for Paxos++ with fault detection mechanism. Algorithm 5 enumerates all types of faults that can and should be detected by correct replicas. Figure 9 gives the new message pattern.
In order to detect all the faults that can violate consistency in anarchy, the modifications include :
1. appending prepare log to view-change message : a view-change message additionally includes the prepare log, and the new synchronous group learns prepared or committed requests from both commit log and prepare log;
2. adding vc-confirm phase (see Figure 4 and Figure 9 for comparison): upon an active replica in new view receives t + 1 vc-final messages, the replica sends a vc-confirm message, which contains the digest of t + 1 vc-final messages to every replica in new view;
3. appending the set of t + 1 vc-confirm messages to a view-change message : in case a prepare log at sn generated in view i is not consistent with a commit log at sn generated in view i < i, t + 1 vc-confirm messages can guarantee that ∃ correct s j ∈ sg i which has received matching send suspect, i, s j σs j to ∀s k ∈ Π 3: upon reception of m = suspect, i , s k σs k and s k ∈ sg i do
4:
SusSet sj ← SusSet sj ∪ {m}
5:
forward m to ∀s k ∈ Π 6: upon ∃ suspect, i, s k σs k ∈ SusSet sj do /* enter each view in order */ start timer
for sn : 1..End(∀CommitLog|∃m ∈ V CSet send new-view, i, P repareLog σps i to ∀s k ∈ sg i 25: upon reception of new-view, i, P repareLog σps i from the primary ps i do
26:
if P repareLog is matching with CommitLog i sj then
27:
P repareLog sj ← P repareLog 28: reply and process ∀m ∈ P repareLog as in common case, except re-executing request 29: sn sj ← End(P repareLog) 30: ex sj ← End(P repareLog) 31: stop timer send new-view, i, P repareLog σs j to ∀s k ∈ sg i
18:
faultDetection(vcSet pre sj ← i /* update the view which generates P repareLog sj */ a For each sequence number sn, either there is a commit log or there is a prepare log. b If there are several requests prepared at sn in the same view, then select one of them by a deterministic way.
A.4 Client request retransmission
In order to guarantee availability with respect to non-crash faulty primary or followers, we propose a request retransmission mechanism which broadcasts the request to all active replicas upon retrans- ∀sn and m, m ∈ V CSet from replicas s k and s k , respectively, forward m to ∀s k ∈ Π mission timer expires and requires every active replica to monitor the progress. In case a request is not executed and replied in a timely manner, the correct active replica will eventually suspect the view.
More specifically (the pseudocode is given in Algorithm 6), if a client c does not receive the matching replies of request req c in a timely manner, c re-sends req c to all active replicas in current view i by re-send,req c . Any active replica s j ∈ sg i , upon receiving re-send,req c from c, forwards req c to the primary ps i ∈ sg i if s j = ps i , starts a timer timer reqc locally and asks each active replica to sign the reply. Upon timer reqc expires and the active replica s j ∈ sg i has not received t + 1 signed replies, s j suspects view i and sends the suspect message to the client c; otherwise, s j forwards t + 1 signed replies to client c.
Upon receiving suspect message m for view i, client c forwards m to every active replica in view i + 1. This step is to guarantee that the view-change can actually happen at correct replicas. Then client c forwards req c to the primary of view i + 1.
Algorithm 6 Client request retransmission. send signed-reply, replies to client c 
Appendix B Paxos++ correctness proof
In this section, we first prove safety (consistency) and liveness (availability) properties of Paxos++. To prove safety (Section B.1), we show that when Paxos++ is outside anarchy, consistency is guaranteed.
In liveness section (Section B.2), we show that Paxos++ can make progress with at most t faulty replicas and any number of faulty clients, if eventually the system is synchronous (i.e., eventual synchrony). Then, in Section B.3, we prove that the fault detection mechanism is strong completeness and strong accuracy outside anarchy, with respect to non-crash faults which can violate consistency in anarchy.
We use the notation in Figure 10 to facilitate our proof of Paxos++. All predicates in Figure 10 are defined with respect to benign clients and replicas. To prove the safety property, we start from Lemma 4 which shows a useful relation between predicates delivered() and accepted(). Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{26-29} and Algorithm 2 lines:{22-25}, client c delivers reply only upon it receives t + 1 matching reply messages from all active replicas in the same view. Conversely, upon client c receives t + 1 matching reply messages from active replicas in the same view, it delivers the reply. Proof :
1. ∃s j ∈ sg i : s j is correct.
Proof : Assumption of at most t faulty replicas and |sg i | = t + 1.
2. Client c expects matching replies from t + 1 active replicas in sg i . Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{26-29} and Algorithm 2 lines:{22-25}.
Lemma 9 stands at the center of Paxos++ safety proof, which is proved by Induction. By Lemma 9 we show that, if a request req is committed at sn by every (benign) active replica in the same view, then, if any request req is committed by any replica in the preceding view at sn, req and req should be the same request. 3. ∃s j ∈ sg i : s j is correct. Proof : By |sg i | = t + 1 and at most t faulty replicas.
4. In view change to i , s j has collected a view-change message m from a benign active replica s j ∈ sg i . Proof : By 2 and 3, view change protocol Algorithm 3 lines:{13-15} have been executed at s j ; outside anarchy, either at most t replicas in sg i are non-crash faulty and there is no network fault, hence ∃s j ∈ sg i : s j received m from s j and s j is correct; or s j received m from at least one active replica s j ∈ sg i and there is no non-crash faulty replica, hence s j is benign.
5. m contains t + 1 matching prepare or commit messages for request req at sequence number sn, generated in view i ≥ i. Proof : By Algorithm 3 lines:{6-7}, benign replicas process messages in ascending view order, so that commit log at sn generated in view i will not be replaced by any commit log generated in view i < i; then by 4 and sg-committed(req, i, sn). Proof : By Lemma 11, ∃req s.t. committed(req , i, sn, s j ) ; by Lemma 8, req = req; by common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{21-22} and Algorithm 2 lines:{18-19}, benign active replicas execute requests based on order defined by committed sequence number sn and sn ; and, by sn < sn .
Lemma 13. If sg-committed(req, i, sn), sg-executed(req , i, sn ) and sn < sn , then ∀ benign active replica s j : prefix(req, req , s j ).
Proof : By Lemma 12.
Now we can prove Theorem 3. Proof :
B.3 Fault detection (FD)
In this section we prove that the fault detection mechanism is strong completeness and strong accuracy outside anarchy.
First we prove a critical property in Paxos++ with FD in Lemma 16 , which can be seen as an extension of Lemma 9. Lemma 16 shows that if request req is committed by a correct replica at sn in view i, then in any subsequent view if request req is prepared at sn by a benign replica, then req = req .
Lemma 16.
If replica s j ∈ sg i is correct and s j ∈ sg i is benign, committed(req, i, sn, s j ), prepared(req , i , sn, s j ), i > i, and ¬∃ correct s j ∈ sg i : i < i, committed(req , i , sn, s j ) and req = req , then req = req .
Proof :
1. We assume ∀i : i ≤ i < i and s j ∈ sg i : if prepared(req , i , sn, s j ) and s j is benign then req = req . Proof : Inductive Hypothesis.
2. Benign s j ∈ sg i has waited for view-change messages from ∀s k ∈ Π within 2∆ time. Finally we prove fault detection property : strong completeness and strong accuracy. More specifically, (strong completeness) if a message is a harmful message to a correct replica, then the sender will be detected eventually; otherwise, (strong accuracy) if a replica is correct, then it will not be detected.
Theorem 5. (strong completeness) If a replica s k fails arbitrarily outside anarchy, in a way that would cause inconsistency in anarchy, then Paxos++ FD detects s k as faulty (outside anarchy).
1. By Lemma 17 , it is equivalent to prove : in view change to i, if m is a harmful message from active replica s k ∈ sg i (i < i), then correct active replica s j ∈ sg i eventually detects the fault of s k . Proof : Equivalent. We assume that m contains commit log of req generated in any view i at sequence number sn :
7. req = req. Proof : By s k , s k is correct and Lemma 16.
8. s k will not be detected by Algorithm 5 lines:{2},(iii).
Proof : By 7.
Q.E.D.
Proof : By 3, 5, 6 and 8.
We can easily prove that if a fault is detected by any correct replica, then the fault is detected by every replica eventually.
Lemma 18. In view change to i, if a correct active replica s j ∈ sg i detects the fault of s k , then eventually every correct replica detects the fault of s k .
Proof : By Algorithm 5 lines:{6-7}.
